The Citizenship Dialectic
Ediberto Román

Table of Contents
I. Introduction ....................................................................................................................................................1
II. The Classic Construction of Citizenship...................................................................................................7
A.

Citizenship’s Equality Component ....................................................................................................9

B.

The Exclusionary Aspect ..................................................................................................................14

C.

The Modern Construction ................................................................................................................19

III. Subordinates in Law .................................................................................................................................29
A.

The Indigenous People......................................................................................................................28

B. The Territorial Island Inhabitants ........................................................................................................36
IV. Subordinates in Fact?................................................................................................................................43
A. African-Americans..................................................................................................................................43
B.

Mexican-Americans............................................................................................................................54

C.

Other non-Whites ..............................................................................................................................58

V. The Raced Nature of Naturalization........................................................................................................61
VI. The Contemporary Domestic Development……….………………………………………..58
VII. A New Construction………………………………...……………..……….………………..65
VIII. Conclusion ..............................................................................................................................................67

Associate Dean for Academic Affairs & Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law. This
is a footnoted version of presentations I have made at the 2004 Law & Society Conference and the 2005 People of
Color Scholarship Conference at George Washington University. I would like to thank Professors Richard Delgado,
Jean Stefancic, Gerald Torres, Ian Haney Lopez, Michael Olivas, Kevin Johnson, Mary Romero, Joe Thome, Linda
Greene, Thomas Baker, Jorge Esquirol, Carlton Waterhouse, and Hannibal Travis for their comments on this article.
I would also like to thank reference librarian Ms. Jan Stone for her invaluable investigative assistance.

I. Introduction
Imagine that you reside in a country not unlike the United States, with a similar cultural,
economic, racial, and ethnic mix. As in many other countries, the events of September 11, 2001
dramatically changed the lives of the inhabitants of your land. Your country passed a series of
Special Laws specifically designed to enhance national security, and has joined the United States in
its efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Your country’s law enforcement and military officials, in several
high-profile arrests that captured the attention of the populace, took three suspects into custody
who allegedly were involved in terrorist related activities. While these high-profile arrests occurred
at slightly different times and in different places, the commonality is that the alleged wrongdoers
were citizens of your country. However, the commonalities end there. As events have unfolded,
your country’s treatment of these individuals varied greatly.
The first stemmed from the capture of a young national actually fighting for the Taliban
regime in Afghanistan. As a teenager, he discovered Islam and came to adopt Taliban and Al Qaeda
beliefs. He traveled to Egypt and Yemen to learn Arabic, trained for jihad in several training camps,
and was said to have interacted with Osama Bin Laden. After his arrest, this individual was not
treated pursuant to the Special Laws as an “enemy combatant,” a status which would have severely
limited his constitutional rights, but proceeded through your country’s traditional criminal system.
The official spokesman for your president declared that, “the great strength of this country is he will
now have his day in court.” He had his family with him throughout the initial process, had a bail
hearing, was provided the right to counsel, eventually entered a plea agreement, and has begun to
serve a twenty year prison sentence, instead of indefinite confinement as an enemy combatant or
execution for treason. The deferential treatment was largely due to his status as a citizen of your
land.
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The second individual was similarly born in your country and was captured in Afghanistan
allegedly fighting with Taliban forces. Unlike the first individual, this accused was treated as an
“enemy combatant” and was immediately sent to a military jail. Your government argued that as an
enemy combatant, it could detain him indefinitely without formal charges or proceedings, and would
allow him due process and access to counsel only when it deemed it necessary. After a lengthy
confinement in a military jail without any hearing or even charges leveled against him, the Supreme
Court ordered that he was entitled to a meaningful hearing and ordered your government to either
produce evidence of his crimes or to release him. Your government never used the citizenship
exception, as it did with the previous individual, to subject him to your land’s traditional criminal
procedures. Instead, it treated him as one of the scores of foreigners captured in Afghanistan.
Ultimately, your government declared that this second individual no longer posed a threat to your
country and entered into an agreement whereby this individual, without ever being convicted of any
crime, would have his citizenship stripped, would be deported to his parent’s native land, and would
be required to pledge never to return to your country.
The third individual was arrested in your land because he was suspected of preparing a
terrorist attack. This individual, despite being a citizen of your land by virtue of being born there,
was immediately held in indefinite detention as a material witness, and later as an “enemy
combatant.”

Although he has been jailed for several years without trial, he faces indefinite

confinement, and only recently has been given the chance to meet with counsel. Even after one of
your federal judges ordered that this individual either be charged with a crime or released, your
government and its attorney general have declared that it will continue to detain him indefinitely,
without trial, for the duration of hostilities in the war on terror.
Arguably the three accused were alleged to have waged war against your land, yet they faced
dramatically disparate treatment. Now consider this. The first individual, who was afforded your
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country’s traditional criminal process and had his day in court with its right to counsel and other
fundamental rights, is Caucasian.

The second, who was subject to potentially indefinite

confinement, ultimately was convicted of no crime, and was effectively forced to agree to be
expatriated from his land and have his citizenship dissolved, is of Arab decent. The third, who
remains in jail to this day and has yet to face a trial, is an ethnic minority descendant from one of
your country’s overseas territories and, as such, is an excellent example of the subordinate
citizenship status given to those islanders.
As is evident to any newspaper reader, the above depiction is not based on a fictional
portrayal, but on the actual events related to the arrests of John Walker Lindh,1 Yaser Esam Hamdi,2
and Jose Padilla.3 While the cases of these individuals may be more complex than the above
suggests, the disparate treatment of three similarly-situated individuals allows critics of the judicial
system to raise questions concerning the motivations behind and basis for the disparate treatment.4
Though many believe that the United States Government’s vastly different treatment of these three
individuals was largely due to racial and class constructions,5 few, if any, scholars have fully explored

1

Ellen S. Podger, Jose Padilla and Martha Stewart: Who Shall be Charged with Criminal Conduct?, 109 Penn. St.
L. Rev. 1059 (2005); Leti Volpp, Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and Alien Citizens, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1595
(2005).
2
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F. 3d 450 (4th Cir. 2002).
3
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y., 2002), rev’d, Padilla ex rel. Newman v.
Rumsfeld, 352 F. 3d 695 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
4
See e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 953 (2002); Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive
Power, Judicial Deference and the Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 Colum. Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 1 (2002). See also “Rights and the New Reality; Self-Inflicted Wounds; Secret Deportation Hearings, U.S.
Citizens Denied Due Process While in Custody. These Evoke Memories of Dictatorships and Undermine the Health
of Our Democracy,” Los Angeles Times. Sep. 10, 2002 at pg. B. 12 (Disparate treatment of Hamdi, Lindh, and
Padilla drew questions from Senator McCain and other leaders, including at least one federal judge).
5
Natsu Taylor Saito, Interning the “Non-Alien” Other: The Illusory Protections Of Citizenship, 68 Law &
Contemp. Probs 173, 208-10 (2005) (Padilla is both an internal Other by virtue of his race and ethnicity, and
perceived as an external Other as a result of his conversion to Islam and the political associations attributed to him.);
Joanna Woolman, The Legal Origins Of The Term “Enemy Combatant” Do Not Support Its Present Day Use, 7 J.
L. & Soc. Challenges 145, 159-60 (2005); Eric K. Yamamoto, White (House) Lies: Why the Public Must Compel the
Courts to Hold the President Accountable for National Security Abuses, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 285, 313-14
(2005) (Lindh, a white American from a middle class family in California, fit the description for enemy combatant,
but the government declined to label him as such; Hamdi, a U.S. citizen of Arab descent, and Padilla, a Puerto
Rican, did not fit the description, but were labeled enemy combatants.)
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the subject.6 Those scholars who have addressed these events have limited their analysis to the
declared American enemy combatants—Jose Padilla and Yaser Esam Hamdi.7 Nonetheless, the
public criticisms of their treatment do not stem from de jure citizenship distinctions established for
different groups. Instead, the public criticism, to the extent there has been any, largely focuses on
applying legal constructs to ethnically diverse groups.8
The post-September 11 events relating to the above well-known cases are recounted here
not to raise questions concerning the application of criminal laws,9 but to demonstrate that the
fundamental legal and societal construct known as citizenship, arguably the most important identity
marker in both its legal construction and application, has always included gradations or levels of
membership.10 In other words, differences in the legal treatment of those within a society who are
supposed to be equal are not only not a new phenomenon, but are consistent with the citizenship
6

While not the focus of this project, a brief discussion of pertinent law relating to the treatment of citizens suspected
of disloyalty is perhaps in order. The leading case on the subject is Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866), where the
Court addressed the propriety of a military court’s jurisdiction over a citizen who was not a member of a military
force. The Court held that the military court had no jurisdiction over such a person, and rejected the government’s
argument that the Bill of Rights did not apply during war. Id. at 118-30. The Court concluded that the military trial
violated Milligan’s Sixth Amendment right to a trial before and impartial jury and his Fifth Amendment’s right to a
grand jury. Id. The second leading case on the subject is Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). In that case, departing
from Milligan, the Court refused to find that either the Fifth or Sixth Amendments prevented a naturalized U.S.
citizen accused of conspiring with a foreign wartime enemy to be tried by a military tribunal. The found no
distinction between citizen and foreign belligerents. Id. at 37-38. The Quirin Court distinguished the Milligan
decision by noting that “Milligan, not being a part of or associated with the armed forces of the enemy, was a nonbelligerent, not subject to the law of war…” Id. at 45.
7
See, e.g., Juliet Stumpt, Citizens of an Enemy Land: Enemy Combatants, Aliens, and the Constitutional Rights of
the Pseudo-Citizen, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 79 (2004). Much thanks are in order to Professor Charles Pouncy for
raising the lack the failure of pundits to include John Walker Lindh in the enemy combatants debates at a Post-9/11
civil rights conference at Florida International University.
8
At least one other person has recently argued that the “enemy-combatant” cases of Hamdi and Padilla have blurred
citizenship constructions. See Stumpt, supra note 7.
9
For a brilliant analysis of the civil rights versus national security debate post 9/11, read: THOMAS E. BAKER &
JOHN F. STACK, AT WAR WITH CIVIL RIGHTS & CIVIL LIBERTIES (Rowan & Littlefield, 2005).
10
Well known is the ongoing struggle with the caste system of India, a phenomena acknowledged even in election
laws that prevent inciting hatred between the classes of citizens. Brenda Cossman and Ratna Kapur, Secularism's
Last Sigh: The Hindu Right, the Courts, and India's Struggle for Democracy, 38 Harv. Int'l L.J. 113, 120. Another
obvious example is the treatment of Jews in Europe, who have a long history of being accorded less than full
citizenship rights. This treatment, dating to early in the Common Era, was memorialized by the Romans in the
Theodosian Code of 425 C.E. and Justinian Code of 570 C.E., prohibiting participation in government, and
restricting life, livelihood, and property ownership. NORMAN F. CANTOR, THE SACRED CHAIN: THE
HISTORY OF THE JEWS 110 (HarperCollins 1994). Indeed, Justinian’s Code prescribed death for those who
broke provisions requiring particular religious affiliations for all citizens. Thomas M. Franck, Is Personal Freedom
A Western Value?, 91 A.J.I.L. 593, 609 n.100 (1997).
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construct’s dark little secret. That secret is the largely unexplored fact that the citizenship construct,
although widely accepted as requiring equality among those with the status of citizen, also contains a
lesser known aspect that fosters differences in the treatment of the inhabitants within a society.
These differences typically are both more vivid and capture greater attention during times of crises.11
In fact, during the recent debates revolving around the appropriate level of civil rights protections
available to accused terrorists after September 11, some writers have questioned the propriety of the
treatment of Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans, while others have championed differences in
citizenship, effectively arguing that “some Americans are more equal than others.”12 In discussing
the post-September 11 civil rights debate, one author observed that “[t]he pertinent question is not
one of balancing, but one of determining which segments of American society deserve less
constitutional protection than others in national crises.”13 Thus, the concept of citizenship implies a
dialectic,

14

or a process of intellectual evolution and self-definition by means of the negation and

transcendence of opposing ideas, between inclusion within a membership group and exclusion of
nonmembers of the group that also defines the contours and meaning of the group itself.15
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See, e.g., Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 73, 1 stat. 596 (expired 1891) (making it a federal offense to make false
criticisms of the government or its officials, or to excite hatred of the people of the United States); Ex parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866) (invalidating President Lincoln’s Suspension of the Writ of habeas corpus); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 42 (1919) (the World War I era prosecution of war critics); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944 (the Japanese Internment case); Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (the McCarthy era 20
year imprisonment of individuals for teaching the works of Marx and Lenin).
12
See, e.g., Arvin Lugay, “In Defense of Internment”: Why Some Americans Are More “Equal” Than Others, 12
Asian L.J. 209 (2005) (book review of MICHELLE MALKIN, IN DEFENSE OF INTERNMENT: THE CASE
FOR RACIAL PROFILING IN WORLD WAR TWO AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004)). See also Jack Utter,
The Discovery Doctrine, the Tribes, and the Truth, Indian Country Today, June 7, 2000 available at
http://www.indiancountry.com/content.cfm?id=2541.
13
Lugay, supra note 12, at 209.
14
Raj Bhala, Hegelian Reflections on Unilateral Action in the World Trading System, 15 Berkeley J. Intl’l L. 159,
187-190 (1997) (describing Hegelian dialectic); Michel Rosenfeld, Comment: Spinoza’s Dialectic and the
Paradoxes of Tolerance: A foundation for Pluralism?, 25 Cardozo L. Rev. 759, 767-770 (2003) (contrasting
approaches to dialectic of Benedict de Spinoza and G.W.F. Hegel).
15
ETIENNE BALIBAR, WE, THE PEOPLE OF EUROPE?: REFLECTIONS ON TRANSNATIONAL
CITIZENSHIP 1, 50, 57 (Princeton University Press, 2004) (describing citizenship as a “dialectic of conflicts and
solidarities,” and specifically as a dialectic between “confrontation with the foreigner” and “communication between
civilizations.”); WILL KYMLICKA, POLITICS IN THE VERNACULAR: NATIONALISM,
MULTICULTURALISM, AND CITIZENSHIP 1 (2001) (describing citizenship and naturalization laws as playing
out a “dialectic of nation-building and minority rights”).
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The tension in the application of the citizenship construct is not limited to times of crises,16
but, at least in the domestic sense, has repeatedly arisen when disfavored groups sought full
membership.17 In other words, the current criticisms of this government’s treatment of Arab and
Muslim citizens after September 11 are not only reminiscent of the World War II Japanese
internment cases, which are widely discussed in legal literature,18 but also the exclusion of disfavored
groups from the definition of social and political citizenship prevalent throughout several thousand
years of recorded history.19 Specifically, this article intends to demonstrate how the concept of
citizenship in Western democracies20 has resulted in effects that are wholly inconsistent with the
purportedly liberal ethos constructing citizenship itself.
Indeed, this duality appears in the first writings on the subject, made over two thousand
years ago, where philosophers and politicians focused on equality for the members of a society, and
in the same breath advocated the exclusion of many desirous of the status and, arguably, eligible to
obtain it.21 Thus from its very genesis, the construct exhibits exclusionary as well as inclusive
aspects, yet the vast majority of the general literature on the subject, and virtually all of the legal
juridical and scholarly pontifications, focus on the more appealing inclusive component of the
construct. Citizenship’s egalitarian aspects will be compared here with the lesser-known, or at least
16

See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 2; Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1.
The central thesis here is to expose the fact that the gradations of membership have not merely arisen during the
exigencies of war or political crises, but have always been part of the obstacles faced by disfavored groups seeking
full membership.
18
See, e.g., Aya Gruber, Raising the Red Flag: The Continued Relevance of The Japanese Internment in the PostHamdi World, 54 Kan. L. Rev. ___ (2006); See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Thinking Through Internment: 12/7 and 9/11, 9
Asian L.J. 195 (2002); Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under Siege: Japanese American Redress and the "Racing"
of Arab Americans as "Terrorists", 8 Asian L.J. 1 (2001); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L.
Rev. 1575 (2002) ; See also Erwin Chermerinsky, Civil Liberties And the War on Terrorism, 45 Washburn L.J. 1
(2005); Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rulings, 83 N.C. L. Rev. 847 (2005); Lee Epstein,
Daniel E.Ho, Gary Fing, Jeddrey A. Segal, The Supreme Court During Crises: How War Affects Only Non-War
Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. rev. 1 (2005); Earl M. Maltz, The Exigencies of War, 36 Rutgers L.J. 861 (2005).
19
Recent scholarship on the war on terror has raised the questions of whether the concept of citizenship is itself a
limit on executive power. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Citizenship Matters: The Enemy Combatant Cases, 19 Notre
Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 33 (2005). See also Utter, supra note 12 (tracing the role of the state as
“institutionalized superiority of one people over another, found in the Discovery Doctrine” back to Aristotle.)
20
See MALKIN, supra note 12.
21
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS BOOK III, Chapter 5.
17
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lesser–acknowledged, theoretical aspects, as well as its more recent domestic applications, which
have repeatedly evidenced selective membership and exclusion.22

Part One explores various

components of both ancient and contemporary citizenship theory. This part demonstrates that
citizenship theory has always extolled the virtues of equality, but has also supported the exclusion of
less favored groups from the status. Part Two explores the concept’s domestic development and
demonstrates that the American experience of citizenship fits squarely within this article’s central
thesis, namely citizenship rhetoric repeatedly champions a model of equality and inclusion, but in
practice disfavored groups suffer repeated denial of full social, civil, and political citizenship rights.
Part Three demonstrates that American constitutional history evinces the creation and maintenance
of formal or de jure subordinate citizens, which include this country’s indigenous peoples and
inhabitants of this country’s territorial island dependencies.

Part Four questions whether this

country has also established de facto subordinate citizens.23 Specifically, this section posits that certain
groups, such as African-Americans, were and perhaps still are less than full citizens despite attaining
such status after the passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution. Unquestionably, the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision effectively confirmed
Plessy’s “separate but equal” paradox that created de facto subordinates until the 1950’s. Part Five
explores the related de jure subordination of groups that should have been eligible for citizenship but
were denied access to it because of the country’s exclusionary naturalization laws. Finally, Part Six
proposes an inclusive model for citizenship based on rights as well as status.

II. The Classic Construction of Citizenship

22

See Barron, supra note 19, at 34.
The once de jure and arguably still de facto subordinate citizenship status of women may be further explored in
the following articles. See, e.g., Gretchen Ritter, Women’s Citizenship and the Problem of Legal Parenthood in the
United States in the 1960’s and 1970’s, 13 Tex. J. Women & L.J. 1 (2003); Catherine L. Fisk, In Pursuit of Equity:
Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in the 20th Century America, 51 Buff. L. Rev. 409 (2003);
Christine Chinkin & Kate Paradine, Vision and Reality: Democracy and Citizenship of Women in the Dayton Peace
Accords, 26 Yale J. Inl’t L. 103 (2001).
23
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Although over thirty years ago a leading constitutionalist declared that the concept of
citizenship is of little significance in American constitutional law,24 the last two decades have
witnessed what several writers have declared “an explosion of interest in the concept of
citizenship.”25 The renewed theoretical focus was sparked by recent world-wide political events and
trends including, but not limited to, increasing voter apathy and long-term welfare dependency in
the United States, the resurgence of nationalists movements in Eastern Europe, and the stresses
created by increasingly multicultural and multiracial populations in Western Europe.26 More recent
events such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, and the United States’
ensuing domestic and global war on terrorism with its consequences to Arabs and Muslims both at
home and abroad; the United States government’s ineffective efforts at rescuing the largely poor and
African-American victims of the Gulf Coast of Louisiana after Hurricane Katrina along with the
widespread characterization of those citizens as refugees; and the recent and ongoing ethnic
uprisings in France suggest that scholarly interest will continue to focus on the subject of citizenship.
While these events have led to a significant amount of public and media attention, they have not led
to much scholarly debate concerning their implications on democratic and citizenship theories.

24

Alexander M. Bickel, Citizenship In American Constitution, 15 Ariz. L. Rev. 369 (1973). In his book, Bickel
argued that the Constitution’s Preamble speaks of “We the People,” not “We the Citizens.” As such, the Bill of
Rights applies to all people, irregardless of citizenship. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF
CONSENT 36 (1975). He argued that the concept of citizenship was not important to the framers and that “the
original Constitution presented the edifying picture of a government that bestowed rights on people and persons, and
held itself out as bound by certain standards of conduct in its relations with people and persons, not with some legal
construct called citizen.”
25
Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory, 104
Ethics 352 (1994) (further noting that the concept of citizenship had been out of fashion since the late 1970’s).
26
Id. The authors suggest that the academic debate is seen as a “natural evolution in the political discourse because
the concept of citizenship seems to integrate the demand of justice and community membership, the central concepts
of political philosophy in the 1970’s and 1980’s respectively. Citizenship is intimately linked to the ideas of
individual entitlements, on the one hand, and of attachment to a particular community, on the other. Thus it may
help to clarify what is really at stake in the debate between liberals and communitarians.” Id.
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Nevertheless, citizenship is the most basic of all rights, “the right to have
rights.”27Accordingly, citizenship is a broadly conceived concept typically deemed a central
component of Western civilization. It is the adhesive that joins the Constitution,28 and binds the
people to the republic.

It also embodies the strongest link between the individual and the

government.29

A. Citizenship’s Equality Component
With roots dating back to Athenian political leaders and philosophers such as Solon and
Aristotle, the concept of citizenship served a pivotal role in the development of democratic order.
Over 2500 years old, the concept remains to this day indispensable for the conceptual construction
and understanding of basic elements of political and legal order.30 This term’s modern description
varies little from the classic vision’s concept.
In Book III of his Politics, Aristotle set forth the foundational statement concerning the
concept’s roots. He asserted that “a state is composite, like any other whole made up of many parts;
these are the citizens, who compose it.”31 Equality among the citizenry is not only a timeless

27

HANNAH ARENDT, THEE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979). Arendt
was one of the first to recognize that Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were two sides of the same coin rather
than opposing philosophies of Right and Left.
28
Johnny Parker, Johnny Came Home Again, A Critical Review of Contemporary Equal Protection Interpretation,
37 How. L. J. 393, 396 (1994). Parker wrote that “[t]he concept of citizenship is fundamental to constitutionally
interpretation.” Id.
29
Yaffa Zilbershats, Reconsidering the Concept of Citizenship, 36 Tex. Int’l L. J. 689, 690 (2001). Zilbershats, in
noting that nationality is the manifestation between an individual and the State, writes that there is no clear
international criteria for defining this connection. Id. at 691. “There is no clear international law stating in which
circumstances a State must confer nationality upon a person and when a person has the right to become a citizen.
The uncertainty and lack of definition in international law ensue from the fact that international law has sanctified
the principle of State sovereignty and non-intervention on the part of one State in the affairs of another.” Id. As
such, he says that “State sovereignty has primarily been reflected in the power of the State to determine who will be
its permanent and preferred members, i.e., who will be its citizens. Indeed, every State has established its own rules
regarding when, how, and upon whom nationality will be conferred.” Id.
30
ULRICH K. PREUSS, THE AMBIGUOUS MEANING OF CITIZENSHIP (2003).
31
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS Book III 126. (Chapter 1: “The State then is composite, and, like any other whole,
made up of many parts, which are the citizens who compose it.”)
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component of citizenship literature,32 but also a basis for the citizenship ideal,33 which is also the
classic or dominant construction of the concept. For instance, Aristotle likened political and social
citizenship to the communitarian structure aboard a sailing vessel—although all sailors (or citizens)
are specialized in their tasks aboard ship, all are indispensable members of a whole, without which
the community cannot function.34 The classical construction also deeply influenced contemporary
philosophers, such as John Locke, Alexis De Toqueville, and John Stuart Mill, who all recognized
the significance of equality among the participants within a society. John Locke is often cited as a
primary influence on the founding fathers because Thomas Jefferson, in drafting the Declaration of
Independence, admitted to drawing liberally from Locke’s Two Treatises on Government.35 In particular,
the famous assertion that all men are “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that
among these are life liberty and the pursuit of happiness,”36 was drawn from Locke’s work almost
verbatim.37 Mill found equality a central component of citizenship and democracy. He used equality
to advocate for granting citizenship status to women.38 De Toqueville in a similar vein declared “the
more I advance in the study of American society, the more I perceive that the equality of condition
is the fundamental fact from which all others seem to derive.”39

32

Erwin Chemerinsky, Articles and Commentary on Equality: In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor
Western, 81 Mich. L. Rev. 575 (1983) (“No value is more thoroughly entrenched in Western culture than is the
notion of equality”).
33
Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 Ga. L. Rev. 245 (1983) (“[I]implicit in the values of citizenship . . . is
the notion of equal membership in the community.”).
34
ARISTOTLE, supra note 31,chapter 4.
35
David L. Wardle, Reason to Ratify: The Influence of John Locke’s Religious Beliefs on the Creation and Adoption
of the United States Constitution, 26 Seattle U. L. Rev. 291, 297 (2002).
36
The Declaration of Independence Para. 2 (U.S. 1776)
37
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 168-69 (The Classics of Liberty Library, Special
Edition, 1992). Locke writes that men are born free and equal in rights. While, all men are equal in the state of
nature, civil society originates when men agree to delegate the function of punishing transgressors. As such, the
government is instituted by a “social contract,” with limited powers involving the reciprocity of obligations.
38
JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 99 ( MIT Press, 1970) . “That the principle which
regulates the existing social relations between the two sexes — the legal subordination of one sex to the other — is
wrong itself, and now one of the chief hindrances to human improvement; and that it ought to be replaced by a
principle of perfect equality, admitting no power or privilege on the one side, nor disability on the other.” Id.
39
ALEXIS DE TOQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 22 (1992). After visiting America, Frenchman De
Toqueville wrote this treatise about what America was like.
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In turn, the founding fathers of this country focused on equality of citizenship prior to the
drafting of the Constitution. For instance, the authors of the Federalist Papers addressed a form of
citizenship endowed with equal rights. John Jay in Federalist No. 2 observed that "to all general
purposes we have uniformly been one people—each individual citizen everywhere enjoying the same
national rights, privileges and protection."40 Madison in Federalist No. 57 observed:
Who are to be the electors of the Representatives [in Congress].
Not the rich more than the poor; not the learned more than the
ignorant; not the naughty heirs of distinguished names, more
than the humble sons of obscure and unpropitious fortune.
The electors are to be the great body of the people of the
United States. No qualifications of wealth, of birth, of
religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the
judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people.41
With respect to the need to protect the citizenry, in Federalist No. 51 Madison notes:
Is it of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the
society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one
part of society against the injustice of the other part. Different
interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a
majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the
minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of
providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the
community independent of the majority, that is, of the society
itself; the other by comprehending in the society so many
separate descriptions of citizens, as will render an unjust
combination of a majority of the whole improbable, if not
impracticable.42
This egalitarian vision was eventually, though not initially, tracked in the supreme legal
document of this country.

The United States Constitution’s central citizenship provision is

contained in the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides: “All persons born and naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and the state
40

THE FEDERALIST NO. 2 at 10 (JOHN JAY). But see also, JOHN P. ROCHE, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT
OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP (Cornell University Press, 1949). Prior to the American Revolution,
citizenship was a right granted by states and provided that “[a]n Englishman moving from one colony to another
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wherein they reside.”43

John Bingham, the primary drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment,

envisioned a concept centered on equality.44 He described the rights of citizens as:
[T]he equality of all to the right to live; to the right to know;
to argue and to utter, according to conscience; to work and
enjoy the product of their toil . . . the charm of that
Constitution lies in the great democratic ideals which it
embodies, that all men, before the law, are equal in respect of
those rights of person which God gives and no man or state
may rightfully take away.45
The United States Supreme Court repeatedly used similar declarations concerning
citizenship.46 For instance, in Afroyim v. Rusk,47 Justice Black, following Aristotle’s language written
over two thousand years earlier, declared “the citizenry is the country and the country is the
citizenry.”48 Justice Brandeis declared in Ng Fung Ho v. White,49 that the “loss of citizenship was
equivalent to the loss of everything that makes life worth living.”50 Over time, both jurists and
scholars have shed considerable light on the importance of the term. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote
in Sugarman v. Dougall51 that “citizenship is supposed to mean something, and something
important.”52 Indeed, it has evolved to become something more than just being born or naturalized
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within the United States.53 The grant of citizenship is the formal recognition of these concepts and
guarantees certain rights and duties, including the right to suffrage54 and service on juries,55 as well as
other important constitutional rights.56

Its importance, however, does not merely lie with the

delineated rights identified by the courts and legislatures.57 Citizenship has become recognized as a
core concept in a liberal democratic state and has become a central component of individual identity
in this society. 58 It is by virtue of an individual’s citizenship status that the individual is an equal
member of the political community.59

The Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause is to

theoretically prevent the states from treating disfavored groups as outsiders or from denying them
“full inclusion in public life of the community.”60 It thus includes a sense of permanent inclusion in
the American political community in a non-subordinate condition.61 Many believe that because
equality and belonging are inseparably linked,62 acknowledging citizenship status confers full,
complete, and equal belonging to the United States.63
The above construction of citizenship suggests that all of the individuals born or naturalized
in the society should be endowed with the right to be equals within that society.64 In fact, Madison’s
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construction suggests that there should be no differences among the citizenry’s rights, despite
differences in class or education.65

Recent declarations share those sentiments: "[i]n claiming

citizenship, an individual - is first and foremost - asserting the existence of a social relationship
between himself and others. Specifically, a citizen is (by definition) someone who can properly
claim the right to be treated as a fellow member of the political community."66 Thus, the Citizenship
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplates only one class of United States citizen.67
Madison and the other authors of the Federalist Papers largely agreed.68 Accordingly, the term
“American Citizen” is an expression of general principle that ought to govern membership in a free
society and ought to confer equal rights.69

B. The Exclusionary Aspect
Despite this focus on equality, both United States federal courts and Congress have either
created or upheld levels or gradations of membership.

In addressing the concept’s classic

constructions, historian J.G.A. Pocock observes that “[t]his account of human equality excludes the
greater part of the human species from access to it.”70 Citizenship’s exclusionary aspect, though
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containing substantial historical support, is largely unexplored in legal literature and decisions.71 Yet,
the roots of citizenship’s dual nature are well established.
For example, in Aristotle’s Politics, though in an passage he championed equality among
members, the philosopher also observed:
Is he only a true citizen who has a share of office, or is the mechanic
to be included? If they who hold no office are to be deemed citizen,
not every citizen can have this virtue of ruling and obeying; for this
man is a citizen. And if none of the lower class is citizens, in which
part of the state are they to be placed?
He later declares:
For [if these individuals] are not resident aliens, and they are not
foreigners . . . may we not so reply, that as far as this objection goes
these in not more absurdity in excluding them than in excluding
slaves and freedmen from any of the above-mentioned classes? It
must be admitted that we cannot consider all those to be citizens
who are necessary to the existence of the state.
...
Since there are many forms of government there must be many
varieties of citizens and especially of citizens who are subjects.72
Citizenship’s classical construction, as evinced in Aristotle’s works, equated the ideal of
citizenship with virtue, in that “the good man and the good citizen are the same . . .”73 Virtue, in
this case, was strictly reserved for those members of society who participated in the polity as
“statesmen,” i.e., persons fit to hold political office. Since polity participation was not a virtue
present in all Athenian community members, not everyone was entitled to full citizenship.
71
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Even the actions of ancient Greek political leader Solon, who is attributed with creating
Greek citizenship, created levels of participants in society in order to appease the wealthy. Despite
dramatically increasing the number of society members able to participate in political order, Solon
maintained the dominance of large landholders by dividing the citizenry into four classes on the
basis of wealth.74 In arguably the very first use of what was to be known as citizenship, Solon used
differences based on land holdings to establish gradations of rights for the members of society, in
this case, based on wealth.75 Thus, in ancient citizenship constructions, the capacity to rule was
more a matter of status than of ability.76
Even Aristotle who at first presupposed a society of homogeneous free men, ultimately
developed a theory based on hierarchy,77 in which a mechanic, for example, would be excluded from
the ranks of citizens, in large part because such an individual typically has little interest in developing
his mind.78 What results is that although the classic vision recognized that the state was a composite
of its citizenship and that all citizens were equal, not all within a society were deserving of the status
of citizen.
The Roman Empire was the other civilization instrumental to citizenship’s classical
construction. Although Rome may not have produced as much well-known literature on the subject
as did its Eastern counterpart, its great contribution lies in its grand application of the citizenship
construct. Due to the success of the Roman Empire, lasting effects of its expansion and influence,
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including the construction of citizenship as a concept, have affected almost every region of the
world.
Rome’s creation of a theory of universalism associated with citizenship is the great
transformation of the concept.79 Rome eventually managed and ensured the growth of its empire on
the basis of a form of universal citizenship of free men and a Stoic notion of universal brotherhood
of mankind.80 In many respects, the universalism inherent in the Roman construction resembles the
Greek construction’s egalitarian notions that extol the virtues of equality among the citizenry. The
Roman approach, perhaps due to the instrumental motivations of expansion, was far more inclusive
than the Greek manifestations. This is due, perhaps, to the Stoics’ development of Natural Law as
the correct law of the nation and the world. Although Rome could only pass laws of convention,
the notion of being a citizen of the world, as well as a Roman citizen, was fostered by both Roman
law and Stoic ideology. The ideal nation-state was a universal nation-state. The innovation of
Rome’s citizenship ideal in the Natural Law context stems from the Roman people’s understanding
of liberty, freedom from involuntary servitude, and freedom to exercise specific rights and to assume
specific duties. Under this ideal of liberty, the Roman people were their own masters, free from
internal domination by a monarch or by a political faction and free from subjection to any foreign
power. The Roman people were thus free to exercise their sovereignty, free to determine their
destiny, and were free to follow those laws and customs that represented the Roman way of life.81
As an individual, the citizen was free from the impositions of slavery; and was free from arbitrary
exactions of fellow citizens, including magistrates. He was free to enjoy a variety of rights: free to
elect his own occupation, free to marry the woman of his choice, free to own slaves, and to
79
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dominate his wife and children. As a citizen, he was free to participate in the assembly, free to vote,
free to hold public office, and free to serve in the army.82
Despite this fervently egalitarian ideal, gradations of membership existed even in this
model.83

For instance, by the fourth century, the plebeian class could hold a number of political

positions, although they were still restricted from the higher rungs of political power. After a bitter
Samnite War also during this time period, Rome offered full citizenship rights to several former
enemy towns, including Arica, but many Latin cities were granted a new kind of second-class or
limited citizenship.84 The inhabitants of these Latin cities were granted legal and economic rights,
but not full political ones.85 Subsequently, other examples of Rome’s struggles with citizenship
gradations arose, such as the “conflict of the orders.”86 In this struggle between the patricians and
plebeians, Rome eventually allowed wealthy plebeians a political voice and upward social mobility
provided that they achieved military successes.87 Thus, in expanding her original tribal organization
from four to thirty-five tribes, Rome maintained the fiction of political participation,88 but did not
create an organization of equal tribes. During this post-Dark Age and pre-Renaissance period,
nation-states recognized the concept of citizenship, but equally recognized its component of
gradations of membership.
During this period, nation-states recognized the concept of citizenship, but with gradations
of membership. Later Western civilizations followed suit. Not unlike the classical Greek gradations,
82
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these early levels of citizenship were largely based on property ownership. For example, in the
fourteenth century, Pierre Jacobi writing on what can be described as municipal citizenship in
France,89 acknowledged the concept of grades of membership. For instance, the major pars was a
group of decision-making citizens, but the citizens who made it up were not equally admitted to it,
which introduced its own differentiation in the kind of citizenship each was granted. This rule of
exclusion was borne by women in particular, who were made ineligible to be participants within
society.90 Sixteenth and seventeenth century citizenship in Bologna also recognized “grades of
citizenship.”91 The sovereign recognized ranks within the citizenry, where nobles held the highest
rank, and merchants—no matter how important—were ignoble, and correspondingly were among
the lowest of ranks.92 Spain, within its own domestic arena as well as in its colonies, included levels
of membership in its eighteenth century notion of citizenship.93

C. The Modern Construction
Contemporary domestic citizenship theory was significantly influenced by both the ancient
and seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophers. It should therefore be of little surprise that
the modern construction focuses on the equality component of the concept.

This domestic

construction of citizenship, which is the theoretical bedrock of twentieth century citizenship studies,
seems to refer not only to delineated rights but also to a broad concept of equal membership and
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incorporation into the body politic.94 A correlative to this concept is a sense of belonging
and participation in the community that is the nation.95 This last component, which contains both
legal and conceptual aspects, demonstrates a psychological component of the term.

This

construction suggests that the anointment of citizenship is an important title that goes to the heart
of the individual's feeling of inclusion as well as the collective citizenry's sense of the value and
virtue of the democracy.96
Citizenship’s belonging or membership facet exhibits a subjective psychological or
“imagined quality” to citizenship.97 The formal recognition of rights, as well as the imagined
attributes of the status, demonstrates the importance in the construction of self for those within and
outside the status classification. These citizen attributes are supposed to define both who are the
people in “We the People.”98 Michael Walzer observed that “[w]e who are already members do the
choosing, in accordance to our understanding of what membership means in our community and of
what sort of a community we want to have.”99
When one considers the concept’s subjective or imagined qualities it may help explain why,
despite the widely held belief that citizenship confers full membership and equality, these lofty goals
are often not met for racial and ethnic minority and other marginalized groups. Indeed, American
history is replete with instances where bias takes the place of sound inclusive egalitarian theory and
those who should be, or actually were provided with citizen status do not enjoy the benefits of
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citizenship.100 Though this tension concerning who are “the Americans” or who are “the People”
can be aptly demonstrated by tracing the history of those who challenged their lesser citizenship
status, the debate concerning this country’s national identity persists today.

For instance, Peter

Brimelow’s 1995 book Alien Nation warned that non-white immigrants were destroying America’s
“ethno-cultural community.”101 According to Brimelow, himself an Englishman, this American
culture is grounded in a shared European ancestry. More recently, Samuel Huntington questions
whether the increasing multiculturalism in the United States will disintegrate into the type of ethnic
strife that destroyed Yugoslavia.102
Irrespective of whether one is willing to accept these recent ethnocentric opinions, this
country has repeatedly used the citizenship construct in exclusionary ways.103 Indeed, one leading
citizenship scholar recently observed that with respect to immigrants, indigenous people, and the
inhabitants of the island colonies, the Supreme Court cases establishing the rights of those groups
established “a vision of the United States as . . . a nation that defined itself in ethno-racial terms as
Anglo-Saxon.”104

Many, such as African-Americans, Latinos and Latinas, Asians, and Arab-

Americans, would argue that they have existed in an anomalous status by holding the title of citizen
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yet enjoying less than full membership status. Whereas ancient societies like Greece formally
recognized inferior groups, such as “metics” or “freedmen;” modern citizenship theory does not
seem to support inferior classes of citizens. Irrespective of whether one accepts the suggestion that
there are levels of citizenship, federal decisions have, at best, been slow in granting full rights to all
those holding citizenship status, particularly with respect to racial and ethnic minorities.
As demonstrated above, the focus of the domestic literature on the modern constructions
of citizenship emphasize equality and inclusion. Although the modern theory of citizenship extols
the virtues of equality as much as the ancients did, the modern practice denies equality to many
members within society. While in ancient times the gradations were largely based upon wealth and
gender, in the heterogeneous society that became the United States, the gradations also manifest
themselves in terms of race and ethnicity.105
Little of the modern discourse of democracy or citizenship would question the concept of
equality, let alone accept levels of membership. Indeed, the United States Congress, as well as the
Supreme Court, has repeatedly addressed the importance of the citizen in a democracy, but has
never openly admitted to endorsing levels of inclusion.106 In analyzing arguably the most significant
twentieth century citizenship decisions—Afroyim v. Rusk and Reid v. Covert,107 one can fairly easily
conclude that by defining insiders, citizenship necessarily defines outsiders, and by guaranteeing full
and equal rights for those within the charmed circles it supports fewer rights—or at least less
attention—for those outside it.108
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The domestic creation of membership levels is a result of using legal fictions to create
subordinate rights. In fact, the role that constructions of subordination, including national origin
and race, have played in excluding members from the United States’ body politic, at the very least,
calls into question the sincerity of the egalitarian citizenship rhetoric. In fact, historically full
birthright citizenship, as well as citizenship through naturalization, the other primary means of
attaining membership, were attainable goals for those not considered to be racial minorities, but
remained elusive or illusory for other classifications of minorities.
American citizenship unfortunately has all too often been a tool for including Caucasians
and excluding African-Americans,109 indigenous peoples,110 and other non-whites.111

For instance,

the legal doctrines created over a century ago to maintain African-American slave status112 and to
deport and exclude legal immigrants, such as the plenary powers, still maintain an inferior citizenship
status in law for the inhabitants of this country’s island colonies, as well as the indigenous people of
this land, as well as a de facto subordinate status of other minorities such as African-Americans.
Despite this reality, the central concept of citizenship in the United States Constitution is not
based on inequality but equality.

The primary source for citizenship within this country, the

Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, is a post-reconstruction amendment specifically
aimed to provide former slaves, i.e., African-Americans, the political rights associated with
citizenship. Although this clause centers on the notion of equality among the citizenry, in practice,
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citizens, particularly those of color, have been repeatedly denied the benefits of equal treatment.113
Many of the inconsistencies in treatment with respect to this group stem from century-old
constitutional doctrines that gave the political branches of government complete or plenary power
over these groups and established disparate treatment for the less favored citizens.114 Those over
whom the United States government exercises complete power were in effect deemed by that same
government to be not true citizens, but in actuality the “outsiders.”115
Much of the disparate domestic treatment of these inferior members of society derives from
century-old constitutional doctrines that are based on xenophobic, nativist, and racist sentiments.
For some, the exclusionary nature of citizenship evinces a relationship between governments and
the governed that can always be dissolved.116
In the 1800’s the United States Supreme Court began articulating a doctrine that formally
113
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subordinated certain groups by allowing the government’s “political” branches so-called “plenary
power” to discriminate against indigenous peoples, inhabitants of the United States’ colonial
possessions, and immigrants. The Supreme Court has defined plenary as a full or complete power,
causing courts to defer to Congress when faced with challenges to official conduct.117 The doctrine
was and continues to be used as a weapon to disenfranchise those groups universally recognized as
the most vulnerable.118 The plenary power doctrine and a similar one applied to African-Americans,
forms the central constitutional doctrine that supports the disenfranchisement of millions of
Americans.

The disparate treatment of these groups provokes this criticism concerning the

citizenship jurisprudence’s rhetoric concerning equality.
The period from the second decade of the nineteenth century to the second decade of the
twentieth century is the significant juridical period when the Supreme Court and Congress attempted
to define what groups were true American citizens.119 The eventual habitual response to this
question by both the United States Supreme Court, as well as the United States Congress, was that
each and every statistically significant racial minority group was excluded from full citizenship
status.120 Between 1823 and 1922 the United States Supreme Court, consistent with the classical
constructions of the construct, iterated the importance of citizenship in a democracy, but endorsed a
model of differentiated levels of membership. In a series of decisions dealing with immigration,
national security, and overseas expansion, the Court endorsed the unequal treatment and inferior
status of various groups that should have been considered citizens.

These cases include the
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infamous Dred Scott121 and Plessy v. Ferguson122 decisions with respect to African Americans; Elk v.
Wilkins,123 United States v. Kagama,124 and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock125 with respect to indigenous peoples;
the Chinese Exclusion Cases126 with respect to Asian immigrants; and the Insular Cases127 with respect to
the inhabitants of the island conquests.

In each of these decisions, racial and ethnic minority

groups challenged the propriety of governmental action that discriminated against them. In each
decision, the Court used similar racial and xenophobic justifications to uphold the disparate
treatment.

With the exception of the treatment of African-Americans, the constitutional

justification to support such unequal treatment was the plenary powers doctrine under which courts
deferred to the political branches of government, when certain groups challenged the violation of
their constitutional rights.
The plenary powers doctrine, essentially deriving from what was first developed as the
inherent powers doctrine, was developed in the late nineteenth century, during this country’s
colonial expansion.

Beginning in 1822, the Supreme Court upheld the federal government’s

doctrine of inherent plenary powers over the indigenous people of this land, the inhabitants of the
island colonies, and immigrants in entry and exclusion proceedings. The decisions that established
121
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and first applied the plenary powers doctrine to various outsider groups included: United States v.
Kagama,128 Chae Chan Ping v. United States,129 Jones v. United States130 In re Ross,131 Nishimura Ekiu v. United
States,132 Fong Yue Ting v. United States,133 Stephens v. Cherokee Nation,134 Cherokee Nation v. Hitchcock,135
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,136 De Lima v. Bidwell,137 Downes v. Bidwell,138 Goetze v. United States,139 Dooley v.
United States,140 The Diamond Rings,141 Hawaii v. Mankichi,142 Kepner v. United States,143 Dorr v. United
States,144 Huus v. Porto [sic] Rico S.S. Co.,145 Balzac v. Porto [sic] Rico.146
In each of the above cases, the United States Supreme Court concluded that even the most
basic liberty protections, as a matter of a constitutional law, did not apply to these groups. The
128
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Court based its holdings on international law principles and found that because the government’s
political branch was primarily responsible for national security, issues that touched upon the status
of individuals from sovereigns within and without the physical boundaries of the United States
should be addressed primarily by the political branch of government, Congress, and not the judicial
branch. The view that ultimately became the plenary powers doctrine evolved over a series of
decisions that purportedly based their determinations upon national security, but also contained
racist, as well as xenophobic, foundations.
The doctrine is perhaps more widely recognized in the immigration area and was first
developed in the immigration setting in the so-called Chinese Exclusion Cases. In Chae Chan Ping, the
Court in 1889 upheld the exclusion of legal Chinese residents, and concluded that courts would not
interfere with the government’s action because it derived from the government’s authority over
national security.147 Three years later, in 1892 in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, the Court upheld an
exclusion of a Japanese immigrant without a hearing,148 invoking the “accepted maxim of
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential
to self-preservation to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to admit them only
in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.”149 As it subsequently
explained in the 1936 decision of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,150 the theory of inherent
plenary powers was premised essentially upon concerns over international law principles that
recognized a nation-state as having the inherent power to take its place among the sovereign nations
of the world despite being a government of limited and enumerated powers.151
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III. Subordinates in Law
The use of the plenary powers doctrine and other similar ones with respect to AfricanAmericans created gradations of members within this society. The constructions of membership
levels have resulted in subordinate rights and created two types of subordinate member groups
within the political structure of a society.
The first group includes those who are subordinate in law, who derive their membership not
from the Fourteenth Amendment, but from the inherent powers of the political branches of
government and the Territorial Clause of Article Four of the United States Constitution.152 This
group includes indigenous people and the territorial island people. There can be little question
concerning the subordinate nature of their rights. The United States Congress has plenary or total
power to govern them, including the ability to nullify any local laws, and may enact federal
legislation that it deems appropriate. Although all indigenous people, as well as the inhabitants born
on the overseas island territories, are United States citizens (nationals in the case of Samoans), they
hold a very different and an inferior kind of citizenship.
The second group includes those who may be subordinate members in fact.

This

classification is far more controversial because this group’s members are Fourteenth Amendment
citizens, and yet their treatment, after their formal grant of citizenship, raises questions whether in
fact they are equal members of society. Members of this group may include African-Americans and
other racial and ethnic minorities.
We will first examine the de jure subordinates, including this land’s indigenous peoples and
this country’s island territories inhabitants. The focus will then shift to the de facto group of
subordinates, who are less equal than other American citizens.
152

In many respects, the inherent powers doctrine is at the forefront of political debates today. For instance, in
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A. The Indigenous People
If the primary means to attain United States citizenship is to be born on United States soil,
indigenous peoples, because they are indigenous, should have been accordingly considered citizens.
They, however, were excluded.

Their disenfranchised status stems from the plenary powers

doctrine.153 As mentioned, this doctrine is premised on the notion that the political branches of the
federal government are responsible for the nation’s security and for its relations with other
sovereigns.154 Since indigenous tribes were seen as part of sovereign nations within the United
States, the doctrine was applied to them in a variety of ways. Paradoxically, a doctrine premised
upon the authority of the political branches of the government to protect the people of the United
States from a foreign enemy was used to justify the continued subjugation and mistreatment of the
original inhabitants of this land. Thus, the original inhabitants of the United States were deemed a
potential foreign threat from within the United States.
The plenary power of Congress over the indigenous nations stems from a series of Supreme
Court decisions that began in 1823.155 The doctrine endorsed the repeated abuse of these peoples’
rights, including the continuous breaches of treaties they entered into with the United States
government and theft of their inhabiting lands.156 In membership terms, within the United States
the doctrine justified the Supreme Court’s imposition of limited membership rights for the
153
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indigenous people. Perhaps more importantly, at the same time the doctrine justified the continued
use of racist stereotypes to maintain paternalistic “wardship” over the indigenous people that
typically resulted in the theft of their land and other rights.157 Chief Justice John Marshall described
the attitude of that era: “[t]he tribes of Indians inhabiting this country were fierce savages, whose
occupation was war, and whose subsistence was drawn chiefly from the forest. To leave them in
possession of their country was to leave the country a wilderness.”158 In 1823, the case of Johnson v.
McIntosh, the Court began developing what was going to become the doctrine justifying the taking of
indigenous lands by looking to the international law principle of discovery,159 which gave the first
Western power to “discover” new lands the exclusive right to that land against other Western
powers and the power “to acquir[e] the soil from the natives, and [establish] settlements upon it.”160
In Worcester v. Georgia, Justice Marshall seemed to recognize the indigenous peoples’ sovereignty,
declaring that the United States government “manifestly consider[s] the several Indian nations as
distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
exclusive.”161 This notion of sovereignty was soon unmasked in United States v. Rogers, where the
Supreme Court rejected a claim that the federal courts did not have jurisdiction over crimes
committed in a reservation.162
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The next series of decisions in 1831, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,163 also known as the Cherokee
cases, involved the Cherokee Nation’s effort to halt the State of Georgia’s attempt to seize Cherokee
land. In dismissing the Cherokees’ claim, the Court found the indigenous territory was part of a
domestic dependent nation that the United States nonetheless held title to, irrespective of the
Cherokee’s will.164 Professor Sarah Cleveland recently observed that the decision not only crippled
the Cherokee Nation’s ability to sue in United States courts, it placed the indigenous people “in a
‘no-man’s land’ status of being neither citizens of the United States nor aliens of sovereign foreign
state.”165 This language makes it clear that as early as 1831 the United States Supreme Court
implicitly created an alien-citizen paradox applicable to this country’s indigenous people.166 In this
paradoxical state, the individuals within this group are neither full citizens with all the rights
associated with the status nor are they completely foreign because they have some form of
citizenship.167
The subordinate as well as paradoxical status of the indigenous people was further
confirmed in the 1884 case of Elk v. Wilkins.168 John Elk, an indigenous person, renounced his tribal
membership, became a Nebraska resident, and sought to register to vote.169 The State of Nebraska
rejected Elk’s application because he was not a citizen despite the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment.170 The Elk Court determined that the Fourteenth Amendment established that
citizenship was available only to persons who at birth were completely subject to United States
163
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jurisdiction.171

Because indigenous nations were “distinct political communities” “within the

territorial limits of the United States,” they were not completely subject to United States jurisdiction.
Noting the exclusive as well as exclusionary nature of United States citizenship, the Court concluded
“no one can become a citizen of a nation without its consent” and because indigenous people
“form[ed] no part of the people entitled to representation,” they “were never deemed citizens.”172
Thus, even after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the United States courts
continued to struggle with indigenous peoples’ citizenship rights.173 Despite Elk’s being born in an
America before the Americans had “discovered” America, the Elk decision established that the
indigenous people of America were treated as wards of the United States’ Anglo-Saxon majority.
The United States has always viewed these people, despite being born in the United States, as
different from full or first-class citizens.174 Even after the Fourteenth Amendment’s ratification, the
Supreme Court concluded that indigenous peoples were not citizens by birthright. In an effort to
protect the perception of what was an American, courts became resolute in not diluting citizenship
with that which was perceived to be an inferior class of people. The government used the pretext
that indigenous peoples were part of a “distinct political community” within the United States, and
they had never engaged in the social compact to swear allegiance to this country.175 Indeed, the
subordination of indigenous peoples in decisions such as Johnson v. McIntosh,176 facilitated the
alternative models of subordinate citizens. This in turn facilitated the Dred Scott decision as well as
other subordination, such as people of color seeking to be naturalized and the inhabitants of this
country’s overseas colonial conquests.
171
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Shortly after the United Sates government considered indigenous people to be something
other than citizens, the government entered into treaties with tribes in order to maintain a
relationship that would purportedly afford each side a sense of sovereignty.177 Not long after the
euphemism of sovereignty was established and treaties were entered into, the United States
government ceased to use treaties and simply “told the indigenous peoples what they could and
could not do, and where they could do it.”178 In large part because indigenous peoples were viewed
as part of their own sovereign tribes and were subject to tribal laws, the United States took the
position that the indigenous people could be dismissed as a separate people living in certain sections
of America that could be controlled without any recourse on their part.179
Eventually, the complete disregard for indigenous peoples gave way to compromises to
another form of subordinate citizenship. The process of granting United States citizenship to
indigenous peoples came in steps and occurred over a considerable period of time. The first step
was the grant of citizenship as an “incentive” to remove these people to the West.180 Thus, some
early treaties between the Indian Nations and the United States provided for the attainment of
citizenship.181 Congress then began to grant citizenship to certain tribes through legislation.182 Other
efforts were made via treaty with Mexico in the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, in which the Pueblo
Indians were deemed United States citizens by their failure to “choose” Mexican citizenship.183 Yet
another step was through the Allotment Act, where indigenous peoples were granted citizenship
177
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upon issuance of an allotment.184 With the passage of the 1924 Indian American Citizenship Act,
the United States government imposed a form of citizenship on all indigenous peoples and declared
them to have concurrent citizenship with their respective tribes.185 By 1924, indigenous peoples
could become United States citizens through legislation, treaty, allotment, and a patent in fee simple
by adopting the habits of civilized life.186
Their membership’s subordinate nature was premised on notions of inferiority. The group
was characterized as existing in a state of “ignorance and mental debasement.”187 The Supreme
Court, in United States v. Ritchie,188 declared “[f]rom their degraded condition . . . and ignorance
generally, the privileges extended to them in the administration of the government must have been
limited; and they still, doubtless, required its fostering care and protection.”189 Subsequently, in 1909
the United States Supreme Court confirmed their limited nature of citizenship. In United States v.
Celestine, the Court held that granting citizenship to “Indians” did not grant them the “privileges and
immunities” of United States citizens.190 In the 1913 case of United States v. Sandoval, the Court
similarly concluded that “citizenship [was] not in itself an obstacle to the exercise by Congress of its
power to enact laws for the benefit and protection of tribal Indians.”191 In continuing to portray
these people in a demeaning manner, Justice Van Devanter observed that “as a superior and
civilized nation,” the United States was obligated to protect “all dependent Indian communities
184
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within its borders,”192 and this was particularly appropriate in that case because Pueblo people were
an “ignorant” and “degraded” people.193 In 1916 the same Justice in United States v. Nice concluded
that “citizenship is not incompatible with tribal existence or continued guardianship, and so may be
conferred without completely emancipating the Indians or placing them beyond the reach of
congressional regulations adopted for their protection.”194 Professor Robert Porter recently observed
that “Indians today have the status of a minor--acknowledged as citizens but not fully recognized as
being able to care for one’s own affairs.”195 They are United States citizens simply because they have
been born on American soil, but they are regarded as being part of their tribal communities and are
afforded rights and immunities subject to their tribal governments.196
The application of the plenary powers doctrine constitutionalized the inferior citizenship
status of indigenous people and as Professor Saito observed in practical terms, resulted in Indian
nations losing 90 million acres of reservation land, more than two-thirds of their former holdings.197

B. The Territorial Island Inhabitants
The plenary powers doctrine is also the basis for the subordination of island inhabitants who
were colonized after the Spanish-American War and World War II.198 For this group, the United
States Supreme Court used the plenary powers doctrine to avoid extending them constitutional
protections. In the period’s major public policy debate, the Court in the leading Insular Case
decision Downes v. Bidwell199 concluded that the Constitution did not “follow the flag.” “The power to
acquire territory by treaty,” Justice Brown affirmed, “implied not only the power to govern such
192
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territory, but to prescribe upon what terms the United States will receive its inhabitants, and what
their status shall be in what Chief Justice Marshall termed the ‘American Empire.’”200 In sum, the
plenary power of Congress arose from the inherent right to acquire territory, and the Territorial
Clause (of the Constitution) endorsed the United States’ treaty-making power, and the power to
declare and conduct war in other lands. The Constitution applied to the territories only to the
degree that it was extended to them by Congress.201 As a result, for this group there has never been
any pretense concerning the Fourteenth Amendment’s applicability or equality for that matter.202
These individuals did not receive citizenship through the Fourteenth Amendment, the vehicle used
to grant or impose such status on virtually all other groups who have attained it. They became
associated with the United States by being inhabitants of lands conquered by the United States. As
acquired in this manner, the United States Supreme Court has concluded that the Territorial Clause
in Article IV of the Constitution, and not the Fourteenth Amendment, determined the rights of this
group.203 As interpreted, this provision endowed Congress with complete or plenary power over
these people.204 In turn, the Court and Congress have kept this group in a subordinate and
disenfranchised status.
The island people who exist under United States’ control but are not full members of the
body politic, reside in the island groups of Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the Northern
Mariana Islands, the United States Virgin Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall
Islands, and the Republic of Palau. 205 These island groups examined here fall under two categories:

200

Id.
Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of American Colonialism: The Insular Cases, (1901-1922), 65 Rev.
Jur. U.P.R. 225, 246-47 (1996).
202
The label of Alien-Citizen can also theoretically apply equally to the other non-white citizens addressed in the
previous section.
203
De Lima, supra note 201; Downes, supra note 201.
204
Id.
205
See e.g., Ediberto Roman, THE OTHER AMERICAN COLONIES: AN INTERNATIONAL AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW EXAMINATION OF THIS COUNTRY’S NINETEENTH AND TWEENTHIETH
CENTURY ISLAND CONQUESTS ( CAROLINA ACADEMIC PRESS, 2006).
201

37

the first are the unincorporated United States territories, and the second are the newly created
sovereign, yet dependent, island groups of the South Pacific. The islands of Puerto Rico, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and American Samoa are socalled unincorporated territories.206 These island groups are dependent lands that the United States
Supreme Court, in a series of decisions known as the Insular Cases, concluded were neither
“foreign” countries nor “part of the United States.”207 The unincorporated territories, undoubtedly
should be classified as those existing under a colonial regime because: the United States Congress
has plenary or complete power to govern the territories, including the ability to nullify local laws and
enact federal legislation dictating the rights of the inhabitants of those territories; none of the
territories are fully incorporated as a state of the union or are sovereign nations; and although all
inhabitants born on the territories are United States citizens (nationals in the case of Samoans), they
do not enjoy similar rights as citizens on the mainland and have no voting representation in the
federal government.208 These last colonial indicia ensures that the island inhabitants do not receive
the same amount of aide or other government largess provided to similarly situated citizens on the
mainland, nor do these people have the ability to vote for President, Vice-President, or any member
of Congress. The second category of islands include: The Federated States of Micronesia, the
Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau. In international circles, they are
considered to be autonomous nation-states but are included herein because of their similar history
of annexation and the existing issues concerning their sovereignty.209
The territories of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau were formally United States’
dependencies and still are largely controlled by the United States. In fact, the United States federal
agency responsible for administering the United States’ territories, the Office of Insular Affairs,
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identifies the Republic of the Marshall Islands, the Federated State of Micronesia, and the Republic
of Palau as being under the jurisdiction of the United States. Despite the international perception of
sovereignty stemming from labels such as “Republics,” or “Federated State,” the Office of Insular
Affairs website classifies these lands as territories where the United States maintains the
responsibility for administering and providing assistance.210 In essence, the method of United States’
control over these three “sovereigns” mirrors the controlling efforts over the unincorporated United
States island territories. This unique history of Palau, Micronesia, and the Marshall islands closely
resembles the stories of the unincorporated United States’ territories of Puerto Rico, the Northern
Mariana Islands, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and American Samoa.211
The United States began its overseas expansion during the period of the Spanish-American
War, which resulted in several Spanish territorial concessions. In the Treaty of Paris, Spain officially
ceded “to the United States the island of Porto [sic] Rico and other islands now under Spanish
sovereignty in the West Indies.”212

Consistent with the United States Constitution’s grant of

Congress’s plenary power under the Territorial Clause, Article Nine of the treaty granted Congress
the power over “the civil rights and political status” of the territories and its people.213 The Treaty
of Paris endorsed the United States’ imperialistic venture as it was among the first times in American
history that in a treaty acquiring territory for the United States, there was no promise of American
citizenship.214 In addition, the treaty contained “no promise, actual or implied, of statehood.”215 As
a result of the war, the United States acquired Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines.216 The U.S.
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Virgin Islands were later purchased from the Danish government in 1907.217
While the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, Guam, and Virgin Islands have obtained a form of
citizenship, and a status of nationals for Samoans, each membership differs from traditional
Fourteenth Amendment citizenship.

The consequential aspect of these colonized islanders’

subordinate membership is that unlike their brethren on the mainland, they are not entitled to
participate in the national political process;218 they have no representation in Congress, and, as
residents of the territories, cannot vote for President and Vice-President, and their repective
territories bear no electoral rights. Futher, they are not entitled to the full Constitutional protection
and their status can arguably be stripped at any time.219
The inhabitants of Puerto Rico were granted citizenship in 1917. However, unlike their
brethren on the mainland, these Americans are not entitled to participate in the national political
process,220 are not entitled to the full protection of the Constitution, and can arguably be stripped of
their status citizenship at any time.221 Similarly, the unincorporated territory of Guam has been
granted this same form of American citizenship, which clearly states that as a possession of the
United States the island can be “bought, sold, or traded by the federal government.”222 Similarly, the
residents of the Virgin Islands were granted United States citizenship in 1927 and the inhabitants of
the Northern Marina Islands attained citizenship in 1976.223 The residents of the unincorporated
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territory of American Samoa have received even less, for as nationals they have even fewer rights.
Accordingly, the diluted form of citizenship granted to these people under the auspices of
Congress’s power under the Territorial Clause changed little in terms of rights but merely facilitated
a belief of belonging to the United States. The inhabitants were granted a title that suggested power
in the political process, but in actuality they received little more than a label, coupled with a
perception on their part that they were attaining something of consequence.
Thus, the inhabitants of the unincorporated territories, with the exception of Samoans, were
granted a title that suggested equal rights and power in the political process but, in actuality, they
received little more than a label, coupled with a perception on their part that they were attaining
something of consequence. For the United States, the effect of these grants was that “[t]hose at the
helm of all branches of the metropolitan government saw as fit that citizenship be granted for
particular political and strategic reasons without effectuating a change in the political condition of
the territories.”224
For the residents of these island territories, their disenfranchised status has not only caused
inequality of political and civil rights, but has also manifested itself through unequal economic
treatment.225 For instance, as a result of their subordinated status, residents of Puerto Rico receive
less favorable treatment than the mainland citizens under a number of major federal benefits
programs.

For the residents of Puerto Rico, federal payments under Aid to Families with

Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and food stamps are made at lower levels and are subject to
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an overall cap.226 Similarly, the Supplemental Security Income program (SSI) does not apply to
Puerto Rico.227 Benefits under a similar program are capped and are made at lower levels than SSI
payments made to eligible persons residing in the States.228 Benefits for needy children are likewise
provided at appreciably lower levels.229
Relying on the territorial incorporation doctrine, the United States Supreme Court upheld
this unequal economic treatment. The Justices have concluded that as long as there is a rational
basis for the discrimination, the Court will uphold the acts. For instance, in Califano v. Torres,230 the
Court held that Congress can discriminate against the elderly, the blind, and the disabled if they are
inhabitants of Puerto Rico, even thought they would otherwise be eligible under the SSI program of
the Social Security Act.231 Similarly, in Harris v. Rosario, the Court upheld as constitutional the
reimbursement of lower levels of AFDC to the people of Puerto Rico.232 Resting on Congress’s
power under the Territorial Clause, the Court in these decisions summarily found a rational basis for
disparate treatment, thereby justifying Congress’s discriminatory action.233
Thus, United States citizenship status to the inhabitants of this country’s island conquests
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was and remains different from that held by their mainland counterparts.234 Such membership,
simply stated, flies in the face of basic foundational constructs of United States citizenship law.

IV. Subordinates in Fact?
A. African-Americans
African-Americans, without question, fall into a category of individuals who were
subordinates in law.

This aspect of their subordination will be briefly explored here.

After

exploring the de jure subordination of African-Americans, a conceptual shift will be made to question
whether African-Americans are still subordinates despite attaining citizenship status with the passage
of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. While
African Americans were finally granted United States citizenship through constitutional amendment
following the Civil War, over a hundred years after that grant, questions persist as to whether they
are truly American citizens. In other words, although they may no longer be subordinates in law,
they may be subordinates in fact. African-Americans and other groups identified here may have
attained official Fourteenth Amendment citizen status, but they have repeatedly been treated as
something less than equals. Thus, even after attaining Fourteenth Amendment citizenship, a status
not achieved by the territorial island people, it appears that African-Americans and other racial
minorities may be subordinates in fact.
The depth of the frustration, estrangement, and alienation of this citizen group was
poignantly expressed by the words of Malcolm X:
The Black should be exempt from all taxation . . . we want the federal
government to exempt our people from all taxation as long as we are
234
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deprived of equal justice under the laws of the land…why should you
be taxed if you don’t get anything in return? How can you be charged
the same tax as the White man…you have no business in a
government, as a second class citizen, paying first class taxes. The
government of the United States should exempt our people from all
taxation as long as we’re deprived of equal protection of the laws . . .
you don’t have second class citizenship anywhere on earth, you only
have slaves and people who are free.235

While the inferior status of African-Americans did not derive from the plenary powers
doctrine, it derives from the United States Constitution, interpreted through similarly racist
constructions. As originally drafted, the Constitution excluded African-Americans in Article I,
Section 2, which counted African-Americans as three-fifths of a free person.236 In addition, the first
Supreme Court decision to address the political status of African-Americans did not base its decision
on the plenary powers doctrine; it did however, arise during the same period of that doctrine’s
creation and similar racist and nativist bases were used to subordinate indigenous people, recent
Asian immigrants, and inhabitants of United States island conquests. Thus, while the case that
sanctioned the disenfranchised African-Americans was technically not a plenary powers decision, it
is analogous in terms of its white-supremacist foundation.
The very nature of how African-Americans arrived in this country strongly suggests that,
particularly those born here must be citizens, as they could owe no allegiance to any other
government of their place of birth.237 Thus, the principles of equality and membership should have
always applied to African-Americans. They, however, have not.
The court-sanctioned exclusion of African-Americans is most vivid in the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford,238 where the Court held that African-Americans,
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even those born in a free territory, were not United States citizens.239 In that matter, the plaintiff
Dred Scott was born into slavery in Virginia sometime around 1800. Scott’s master, an Army
doctor, eventually moved him to Minnesota, a jurisdiction that forbade slavery. Scott sued for his
freedom claiming that he was in a free territory and therefore could not be a slave in that land. After
engaging in an extensive discussion surrounding the meaning of citizenship, Justice Taney, writing
for the Court, concluded “we think the Negroes are . . . not included and were not intended to be
included, under the word ‘citizens’ in the constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights
and privileges which that instrument provides for and secures citizens of the United States.”240
The Court refused to recognize citizenship for this group because of their perceived
inferiority.241 Specifically, the Court characterized African-Americans “as beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race.”242 The levels or gradations of membership
established in the very first writings on the concept of citizenship, dating back to the ancient Greek
writings of Aristotle, were specifically endorsed in the Scott decision. Writing for the majority,
Justice Taney declared:
We proceed to examine the case as presented by the pleadings.
The words ‘people of the United States’ and ‘citizens’ meant the
same thing. They both describe ‘the political body who, according
to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold
the power and conduct the government through their
representatives. They are what we familiarly call the ‘sovereign
239
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people,’ and every citizen is one of this people, and a constituent
member of this sovereignty. The question before us is, whether the
class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose a
portion of this people, and are constituent members of this
sovereignty? We think they are not, and they are not included, and
were not intended to be included, under the word ‘citizen in the
Constitution, and can therefore claim none of the rights and
privileges which that instrument provides for and secures to
citizens of the United States.243

In his concurring opinion, Justice Daniel observed:
The African . . . was regarded and owned in every State in the Union
as property merely, and as such was not and could not be a party or
an actor, much less peer in any compact of form of government
established by the States or the United States . . . [S]o far as rights and
immunities appertaining to citizens have been defined and secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States, the African race is not
and never was recognized [sic] either by language or purpose of the
former . . . 244

Justice Daniel went further and specifically argued that freed blacks possessed an
intermediate membership level akin to that of a “freedman” instead of what Dred Scott argued in
favor of—citizen. Accordingly, as a result of the propriety of membership, Justice Daniel opined
that African-Americans could not possess citizenship’s rights and privilege. The Justice made
specific references to the Roman law system of membership that included slaves, freedmen, and
citizens as a basis to support a similar class system within the United States. He noted:
The institution of slavery, as it exists and has existed from the period
of its introduction into the United States, though more humane and
mitigated in character than was the same institution, either under the
republic or the empire of Rome, bears, both in its tenure and in the
simplicity incident to the mode of its exercise, a closer resemblance
to Roman slavery than it does to the condition of villanage, as it
formally in England. Connected with the latter, there were
peculiarities, from custom or positive regulation, which varied it
materially from the slavery of the Romans, or from slavery at any
243
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period within the United States.
...
With regard to slavery amongst the Romans, it is by no means true
that emancipation, either during the republic or the empire,
conferred, by the act itself, or implied, the status or the rights of
citizenship.245

Ultimately, the Scott Court adopted the Roman subordinate level of participation model
within the 1800’s American society. Irrespective of their title of free person or slave, the AfricanAmerican could not become a full member of society.246 In other words, because of the Court’s
endorsement of state-sanctioned racism and marginalization, non-whites, such as AfricanAmericans, were incapable of attaining equality in terms of full rights under the Constitution.
Eventually, after a long, bloody, and destructive civil war, the United States Constitution was
amended and purportedly granted “all persons” born in the United States citizenship status.
Nonetheless, as W.E.B. Dubois questioned after the civil war, serious doubts persisted as to whether
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African-Americans were not only free but political persons.247 Dubois noted that the Fourteenth
Amendment emancipates a multitude with no political rights. Accordingly, while the perception of
many may be that emancipation would immediately evolve to enfranchisement, as Dubois feared,
that conclusion was far from the case.248 Despite theoretically attaining citizenship and its related
rights and anointments of belonging, African-Americans were subsequently and repeatedly treated in
an unequal manner,249 notwithstanding the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was
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supposed to grant them full citizenship status. As a reconstruction amendment, the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted to specifically recognize that African-Americans born in the United States
were citizens. In the Civil Rights Cases in 1883, the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875,
which prohibited “any person” from denying “any citizen” access to privately owned places of
public accommodations on the basis of race.250 Justice Bradley confirmed the lower citizenship
status of African-Americans when he declared:
There were thousands of free colored people in this country before
the abolition of slavery, enjoying all the essential rights of life, liberty,
and property the same as white citizens; yet no one, at that time,
though it was any invasion of their personal status as freemen
because they were not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white
citizens, or because they were subjected to discrimination in the
enjoyment of accommodations in inns, public conveyances, and
places of amusement.251

Scholars have chronicled the pre-Civil War, as well as post-Civil War, disenfranchisement of
African-Americans. These chronicles trace the post-Civil War efforts by white Southerners to
immediately attempt to implement a de facto form of slavery through efforts such as the “Black
Codes” designed to ban political participation in particular, and destroy any pretense of equality, in
general.252 These oppressive efforts occurred with the full support of President Andrew Johnson.253
The continued disparate treatment of these people, which was often sanctioned by the Court,
created the de facto inferior citizenship status of this group.254 For instance, despite the passage of the
Fourteenth Amendment, in Plessy v. Ferguson,255 Justice Brown, writing for the majority, upheld a
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statute that required the segregation of white and “colored” persons.256 Justice Brown based his
discussion on a constructed distinction between social and legal quality.257 He concluded that “[t]he
object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two
races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality.”258
The social versus legal distinction of Plessy replicated the tortured logic of Dred Scott despite
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Plessy Court reiterated that, notwithstanding the
Amendment’s declarations that “all persons born or naturalized” would be citizens, AfricanAmericans were not recognized as true citizens; African-Americans were citizens in name, not in
law. The concepts of equality of rights and equality of opportunity were inapplicable to them. Even
after the Fourteenth Amendment’s enactment, which was specially passed to acknowledge the
freedom and equality of former slaves, the Supreme Court in Plessy reiterated that African-Americans
could be treated unequally. Indeed, they were something less, perhaps even still slaves, to borrow
Malcolm X’s sentiments. These events highlight that despite attaining a status that is supposed to
connote equality, African-Americans, at least during the era closely following the reconstruction
amendments of the Constitution, were not full and equal citizens.
Though Brown v. Bd. of Education259 specifically rejected the separate but equal dichotomy of
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Plessy, even that decision failed to lift segregation’s stigma in public schools, as evidenced by the
Brown II decision, its progeny, and the social phenomenon of white-flight. African-Americans to this
day face either unequal treatment or must be members of a group that repeatedly face a series of
unfortunate events.260 These examples may come from a variety of circumstances including: racial
profiling by police, such as DWB or “Driving While Black,”261 or the more subtle forms of
subordination as identified by Ellis Close in his book The Rage of a Privileged Class,262 where he
addresses how African-Americans, irrespective of their academic or financial achievements, are
repeatedly reminded of their inequality of society.263
A recent manifestation of the African American subordinate citizenship debate concerns the
voting representation of residents in the District of Columbia. Of the over 550,000 residents of
D.C., 60% are African American.264 While members of this community pay federal and local taxes,
serve in the armed forces, and serve on juries to uphold federal law and policies, these residents have

260

I am often reminded of this subordinated status when I recall when a dear friend, who happens to be AfricanAmerican and named Rodney King, oddly enough, wanted to leave my house after a long debate about racial
politics at around 2:00 a.m. I told him to stay because the bus station, the New York/New Jersey Port Authority,
wasn’t very safe. He simply reminded me “Ed, remember I’m black, everyone sees me as a criminal, so they are
scared -- I’ve got more problems with cops.” This saddened me and still does because you see my friend, who
happens to be the most honest and honorable man I’ve ever met, could never take off the chains of stigma and
subordination. It reminds me that despite my pride and willingness to fight for racial justice, I can hide. Because of
racial constructions based on skin color, I can put on a suit or sweats and be the proverbial boy next door. My best
friend can rarely, if ever, do that and I hope I never forget that fact.
261
For a detailed exposé of the too often substantiated perception that blacks often face greater scrutiny at the hands
of police officers than whites, see David A. Harris, The Stories, The Statistics, And The Law: Why "Driving While
Black" Matters, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 265 (1999).
262
ELLIS COSE, THE RAGE OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS (Harper Perennial, 1993).
263
Id. at 4-10 (“You feel the rage of people, [of] your group . . . just being the dogs of society.”). Note: on microaggression often non-minority speakers and actors are oblivious to the repetitive, debasing innuendoes, even
unintended disrespectful comments that comprise micro-aggression. See Peggy C. Davis, Symposium: Popular
Legal Culture, Law as Micro-aggression, 98 Yale L.J. 1559 (1989). In a synthesis of writings on the topic, Prof.
Davis explains micro-aggression as “ . . . subtle, stunning, often automatic, and non-verbal exchanges which are ‘put
downs’ of blacks by offenders . . . Psychiatrists who have studied black populations view them as ‘incessant and
cumulative’ assaults on black self-esteem.” (citations omitted); reprinted in RICHARD DELGADO AND JEAN
STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (New York University Press, 2001).
264
US Census, 2000 available at http://www.census.gov/.

51

no voting representation in Congress.265 It wasn’t until 1961 when the Twenty-Third Amendment of
the Constitution was ratified by the states, in which the residents of the District of Columbia were
granted the right to vote in presidential elections.266 This marked the first time that United States
citizens—who were not residing within the political, governmental unit of a state—were granted the
right to vote in presidential elections.267 However, this is their only voice in the political process.
Voters in the District of Columbia elect a delegate to the House of Representatives who can vote in
committee and draft legislation, but who does not have full voting rights.268 Additionally, voters
elect two “shadow” senators269 and one shadow representative270 as non-voting representatives who
lobby Congress on District of Columbia issues and concerns.

Denial of Congressional

representation to the predominantly African American community in the District of Columbia to at
least some scholars “not only suggests a belief in the unfitness of the population to participate
equally in national life but creates the kind of ‘uncomfortable resemblance to political apartheid’ that
the Supreme Court condemned and invalidated . . . ”271
More recent “unfortunate events” faced by African-Americans is evidenced by the treatment
of this group during the 2000 presidential election. In a racially charged national election that was
decided by less than 700 votes in the pivotal State of Florida, a state where the governor is the
brother of the election’s eventual victor, and where both brothers were strongly disliked by a
majority of African-American voters due to their positions on matters such as civil rights, the United
States Commission on Civil Rights investigated widespread allegations of discrimination of African-
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Americans on election day. The Commission’s report found numerous irregularities on Election
Day and confirmed that perhaps thousands of African-Americans may have been denied their right
to vote.272 The report concluded: (1) the most dramatic undercount in Florida election was the
uncast ballots of countless eligible voters who were wrongfully turned away from the polls; (2)
statistical data, reinforced by credible anecdotal evidence, pointed to the widespread denial of voting
rights; and (3) the disenfranchisement of Florida’s voters fell most harshly on the shoulders of
African-American voters. The report concluded that the magnitude of the impact could be seen
from any of several perspectives:
•

Statewide, based upon county-level statistical estimates, black voters were nearly
ten times more likely than non-black voters to have their ballots rejected.

•

Estimates indicated that approximately 14.4 percent of Florida’s black voters cast
ballots that were rejected. This compared with approximately 1.6 percent of
non-black Florida voters who did not have their presidential votes counted.

•

Statistical analysis showed that the disparity in ballot spoilage rates—i.e., ballots
cast but not counted—between black and non-black voters was not the result of
education or literacy differences.

•

Approximately 11 percent of Florida voters were African-American; however,
African-Americans cast about 54 percent of the 187,000 spoiled ballots in
Florida.273

The Commission found further troubling facts concerning the election including that there
was a high correlation between counties and precincts with a high percentage of African-American
voters and the percentages of spoiled ballots. It concluded that nine of the ten counties with the
272
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highest percentage of African-American voters had spoilage rates above the Florida average; of the
ten counties with the highest percentage of white voters, only two counties had spoilage rates above
the state average. Gadsden County, with the highest rate of spoiled ballots, also had the highest
percentage of African-American voters. The data further showed that 83 of the 100 precincts with
the highest numbers of spoiled ballots were black-majority precincts.274

B. Mexican-Americans
Mexican-Americans are another group whose equal treatment under the law is suspect. Their
theoretical inclusion as subordinates arose during the same period of the first use of the plenary
powers doctrine was similarly based on racist and nativistic perspectives. As one writer noted: “Fifty
years before the pilgrims landed at Plymouth Rock, there were Latino-Latina urban centers in New
Mexico and in Florida. Yet, Latinos and Latinas, according to most Americans, are our most recent
arrivals–and they have some basis for thinking that.”275 Many Americans know that the United States
conquered land from the indigenous people consisting of approximately “two million square miles
of territory by conquest and by purchase.”276 What is not as well known is the fact that the United
States conquered Mexico in 1848 and took over half its then-existing territory. The states of
California, Nevada, and Utah, as well as portions of Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, and Wyoming
were created from a 529,000 square mile cession by the Republic of Mexico.277
The taking of the Mexican land was a result of the nation’s westward expansion as journalist
John O’Sullivan noted in 1845:
Away, away with all these cobweb tissues of rights of discovery,
exploration, settlement, contiguity, etc. The American claim is by the
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right of our manifest destiny to overspread and to posses the whole
of the continent which Providence has given us for the development
of the great experiment of liberty and federative self-government
entrusted to us. It is a right such as that of the tree to the space of air
and earth suitable for the full expansion of its principle and destiny of
growth.278

Prompted by this spirit of ‘manifest destiny,’ the United States declared war against Mexico
to acquire additional territory.279 The result was the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
which states in part:
The United States of America, and the United Mexican States,
animated by a sincere desire to put an end to the calamities of the war
which unhappily exists between the two Republics, and to establish
upon a solid basis relations of peace and friendship, which shall
confer reciprocal benefits upon the citizens of both, and assure,
harmony and mutual confidence, wherein the two peoples should
live, as good neighbors . . . 280

Among other things, the treaty provided that the United States would respect private property rights
of Mexican citizens in the newly created portions of the United States and those individuals would
be granted United States citizenship.281
However, as had occurred with the indigenous peoples,282 many of the treaty provisions were
never honored.283 Despite the treaty’s pledge to “secure Mexicans their rights to property, by the
turn of the century almost all Mexican-owned land was lost during the land grant adjudication
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process [and] . . . challenges from squatters, settlers, and land speculators also promoted land
alienation.” Most fundamentally, “many Mexican citizens, transformed by the Treaty into United
States citizens of Mexican descent, and their descendants, never enjoyed full membership rights in
this society, despite the Treaty’s promise that they would.”284 As Professor Richard Delgado
observed:
The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo purported to guarantee to
Mexicans caught on the United States side of the border, full
citizenship and civil rights, as well as protection of their culture and
language. The Treaty, modeled after ones drawn up between the
United States and various Indian tribes, was given similar treatment:
The Mexicans properties were stolen, rights were denied, language
and culture suppressed, opportunities for employment, education,
and political representation were thwarted.285
Mexican-Americans were disenfranchised in numerous other ways including immigration.
The Constitution and the courts did little to interfere with the racist immigration quotas, the Bracero
system, and dragnet searches, seizures, and deportations of anyone who looked Mexican.286 In
theory, the Treaty, which ended the Mexican-American War of 1846 to 1848, promised ‘grace and
justice’ by codifying the principal diplomatic objectives of each party. For the United States, ‘grace’
meant purchasing, for the bargain-basement price of $15 million, thousands and thousands of acres
of former Mexican territories. For Mexico, ‘justice’ meant protecting the civil and property rights of
Mexican citizens, including Indians, who without moving had suddenly become new residents (and
citizens) of a foreign nation.287 As one writer observed:
In the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and in numerous Indian treaties,
the United States promised to respect property rights of the
conquered. To make such promises during the nation’s idealistic
youth or during its feverish expansion across a seemingly-unlimited
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continent is one thing; to keep them is quite another.288
Despite the grant of United States citizenship pursuant to the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
in 1848, over one hundred years later Mexican-Americans were still not accepted as full members of
the body politic.

For instance, in 1954, the United States government initiated “Operation

Wetback,” the campaign to deport undocumented Mexicans.289 During this massive campaign, over
one million290 Mexican immigrants, as well as United States citizens of Mexican ancestry, and
undoubtedly other Latinas and Latinos, were deported.291 The Mexican-American community was
directly affected by this campaign because it was “aimed at racial groups, which meant that the
burden of proving citizenship fell totally upon people of Mexican descent.” Those unable to present
such proof were arrested and sent to Mexico.292
Moreover, when examining the disenfranchisement of Mexican-Americans one does not
have to look further than the popular depictions of illegal immigrants as Mexicans who have illegally
crossed the border, despite the fact that many illegal immigrants are individuals overstaying their
visas.293

A classic example of the current anti-Mexican-American fervor and the potential

consequences of such labeling is California’s attempt to implement Proposition 187, which would
have denied aliens access to government-funded social services including health care and
education.294

The campaign to pass Proposition 187 played a consequential role295 in former
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California Governor Pete Wilson’s re-election campaign.296 Television advertisements emphasized
Wilson’s support for the proposition as they depicted “shadowy Mexicans” crossing the border in
large numbers.297 Much of the support for the proposition used loaded pejoratives such as “those
little f--kers” and even suggested that California may become a “third world country” or
“annexed.”298 Obviously, Proposition 187, though facially neutral, centered on the issue of race and
proponents gained support by stirring the fear of the foreigner.299 While some may suggest that
appropriate immigration limits are warranted, if Proposition 187 had been implemented, further
subordination and resulting stigmatization of Mexican-Americans and other Latina-Latino
immigrants would likely result with profound negative effects.300
Similarly, if Proposition 187 had been implemented, authorities could presume that those of
Mexican ancestry and even other Latinas and Latinos were illegal; this presumption could lead to the
denial of benefits and related deprivations for Latinas and Latinos unless they could prove
citizenship.

Such negative consequences have resulted from provisions of United States

Immigration Laws that permit sanctions against those who employ undocumented persons.301 In
fact, the United States Commission on Civil Rights has found “no doubt that the employer
sanctions have caused many employers to implement discriminatory hiring practices.” 302

C. Other Non-Whites
Several legal scholars have addressed the outsider or foreign status of other ethnic citizens in
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the United States. Several writings have turned to the treatment of Asian-Americans to demonstrate
their subordinate status notwithstanding their attainment of citizenship.

According to these

works,303 American society has imposed a label of foreignness on several groups of American
citizens.304 The scholarship includes Latina and Latino citizens, Asian-Americans, Arab-Americans,
and other non-whites in the category of other non-white/non-black subordinates.305 In addition to
being characterized as the “forgotten Americans” and the “invisible” members of society, they are
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arguably endowed with the immutable characteristic of alien or foreigner.306 Noting that race
relations in America are typically analyzed in the white-over-black paradigm, Professor Gotanda has
argued that this construct has the effect of facilitating the failure to examine the unique racism faced
by the non-white non-black racial minorities.307 In the white-over-black paradigm, if a person is not
white, then that person is socially regarded as something other than American.308
An example of the inferior status of other non-whites is the historical use of the plenary
powers doctrine to justify the deportation and exclusion of undesirable Asian immigrants who
otherwise were entitled to enter or stay in the United States. In the Chinese Exclusion cases the
United States Supreme Court first extended the plenary powers doctrine to immigration. In Chae
Chan Ping v. United States309 the plaintiff, a Chinese resident, obtained a required certificate of re-entry
pursuant to an 1884 law established by Congress and visited family in China. Prior to his return,
Congress passed a new law precluding re-entry of all Chinese workers, irrespective of whether they
had a certificate of re-entry. The Supreme Court rejected the claim that the government had
violated an international treaty as well as the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Though
acknowledging a technical violation of the treaty with China, the Court decided to enforce the
Congressional action under the “last in time rule,” whereby a court would uphold a federal law that
conflicts with a treaty even if it violates international law.310 In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court
iterated Congress’ power to regulate the rights of immigrants, which was deemed an inherent power
of the government to protect itself from foreign threats. In practice, then as it is now, the foreign
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threat was typically categorized in racial constructions as non-white.311
The preceding section illustrated how two of the three classic means of attaining
citizenship—(1) Jus Soli or acquisition of the status by birth by being in this country and (2) Jus
Sanguinis or being born of a United States citizens—were not sufficient for the attainment of full or
equal citizenship status for a wide variety of people of color, including the indigenous people of the
United States and the inhabitants of the island conquests. Thus, the history of birthright citizenship
has been raced or perverted by the pernicious and yet lesser-known side of the citizenship duality.

V. The Raced Nature of Naturalization
Unfortunately, the other means of attaining membership status under the Citizenship Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment has been applied in an equally racist manner as recently documented
in the book White By Law, where Ian Haney Lopez chronicled the history of United States
naturalization law.312 Pursuant to Article I of the United States Constitution, Congress is empowered
“to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.”313 Haney Lopez observed that “from the start,
Congress exercised this power in a manner that burdened naturalization laws with racial restrictions
that tracked these in law of birthright citizenship.”314
For instance, the first naturalization act enacted in 1790 limited naturalization to “any alien,
being a free white person who shall have resided within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the
United States for a term of two years.”315 For over 162 years, race was a determining factor in
whether one could become naturalized. It was only after the Civil War in 1870 that African-
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Americans could be naturalized.316 From 1870 until 1952 when strict white versus black racial
prerequisites were abolished whites and blacks could be naturalized, but other minority group
members, particularly Asians, could not. During the period of these racial prerequisites applicants
from Hawaii, China, Japan, Burma, and the Philippines, as well as all mixed-race applicants, failed in
their naturalization arguments before courts.317 Courts, however, concluded that applicants from
Mexico and Armenia were “white,” but vacillated over the whiteness of applicants from India, Syria,
and Arabia.318 Not only were these naturalization laws shameful examples of this country’s racist
hostility to non-whites, but these hostilities were specifically expressed, ironically, through the
concept of citizenship. Haney Lopez cogently summarized the effect of such exclusionary efforts:
The prerequisite cases make clear that law does more than simply
codify race in the limited sense of merely giving legal definition to
pre-existing social categories. Instead, legislatures and courts have
served not only to fix boundaries of race in the forms we recognize
today, but also to define the content of racial identities and to specify
their relative privilege or disadvantage in United States society. The
operation of law does far more than merely legalize race; it defines as
well the spectrum of domination and subordination that constitutes
race relations.319

That awful chapter in our nation’s history, which legally validated segregation and racial
subjugation, also propagated those same racist ideologies through the concept of membership in the
body politic. There is no more powerful or efficient method of disassociating those unwanted
ethnic and racial groups from the more desirable majority than by excluding them from membership
into “Our Country.” If Aristotle was correct and a nation is little more than a composite “like any
other whole, made up of many parts [and] these [parts] are the citizens that compose it,”320 then this
tool of alienation forces those unfit for membership to become parts of nothing—aliens in their
316
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own land.
Having understood the mechanics of the duplicitous application of the citizenship concept,
the question begged is: What should the ideal form of citizenship look like? While this is a simple
question with an altogether very complex and possibly controversial answer, a review of the
citizenship construct’s current manifestation is in order before exploring an arguably more
aspirational vision of citizenship.

VI.

The Contemporary Domestic Development

Contemporary domestic citizenship theory was significantly influenced not only by the ancient
and Eighteenth Century philosophers, but also by the work of T. H. Marshall’s 1949 “Citizenship
and Social Class.”321

Marshall divides citizenship rights into three categories: civil rights, political

rights, and social rights. Virtually every academic discourse since Marshall’s work has used his rightsbased paradigm. This not to say, however, that the Marshall framework is not without its critics.
Marshall’s liberal framework has been criticized by both the political left and right. The new right
school on citizenship criticizes the framework for focusing on a passive model of membership
without any significant obligations attached to citizenship.322 While the notion of greater civic
participation is appealing when one considers, just to name two examples, the recent wave of tax
breaks for the rich in this country323 and the disproportionate representation in the military by
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children of the poor, working-poor, and of color,324 the new right’s vision of obligations appears
selective. On the left, cultural pluralists advocate differentiated citizenship or preferred citizenship
rights for marginalized groups because citizenship has been defined as rights for white men.325 The
pluralists argue that rights, including special rights and exemptions, should depend upon group
membership.

While also sounding appealing, the pluralists’ model, practically and politically

speaking, is highly unlikely to be achieved. More importantly, as this article demonstrates, there has
always existed differentiated citizenship; it has just worked to marginalize the politically weak. To
borrow from Derek Bell’s interest convergence theory, without any incentive for the majority, the
question that arises is how will citizenship theory and practice make a 180 degree turnaround to now
favor the minority? Another group, the communitarians, call for a greater emphasis and focus on
civil or social associations, such as churches, charities, or neighborhood associations to promote
more active citizenship and responsibilities.326
While devoteés of the communitarian, cultural pluralist, and new right schools of citizenship
have questioned or expanded upon Marshall’s rights-based focus,327 virtually all groups address
citizenship through Marshall’s rights-based framework. In fact, virtually all citizenship discourse for
the latter part of the last century implicitly or explicitly derived from Marshall’s theoretical model.
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According to Marshall’s framework, a properly functioning liberal welfare state is required to
guarantee complete civil, political, and social rights to all citizens.328 Accordingly, the welfare state by
ensuring full rights to all ensures that every member of society feels like a full member of society.329
This contemporary domestic construction of citizenship would seem to refer not only to
delineated rights but also to a broad concept of equal membership or incorporation into the
body politic.330 A correlative of this concept is a sense of belonging and participation in the
community that is the nation.331 This last component, which contains both legal and conceptual
aspects, demonstrates a psychological component of the term. This construction suggests that the
anointment of citizenship is an important title that goes to the heart of the individual's feeling of
inclusion as well as the collective citizenry's sense of the value and virtue of the democracy.332

VII. A New Construction
The classical contemporary writer on the subject, T.H. Marshall, probably had it right. He
envisioned and elaborated on a model that has an egalitarian and inclusive bent coupled with an
affirmative obligation by the state to achieve the goals of equal citizenship. The communitarian
model for greater civic participation through associations expands upon this model without
necessarily contracting it. The new right’s vision reeks of the perceived classic conservative effort to
focus blame on the weak.
To step back for a moment, the classic ancient writers, such as Aristotle, also extolled
theories facially based on inclusion, but Greek and Roman leaders, as well as many others in their
practice, included slavery and elitism within their framework as a natural extension of citizenship.
However, the classical notion was at least honest in the sense that it never purported to be
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something it was not, namely, a wholly inclusionary and egalitarian architecture for socio-political
function. The Greeks admitted with blunt sincerity the inferiority of their subjects and slaves. Plato,
author of that famous model for republican government, wrote in his Laws, that “the soul of the
slave is utterly corrupt, and . . . no man of sense ought to trust [him].”333
Certainly, this is far from an ideal application of the egalitarian concept of citizenship. It is,
nevertheless, truthful about its citizenship architecture. This is far from the case in the United
States. With one hand, we argue with the laudable words of John Locke, James Madison, and
Thomas Jefferson, and the other hand, we ignore the subordinate legal status of the indigenous
peoples of our land and the inhabitants of our island colonies. We, in essence, in almost an
unnoticed fashion, declare that certain groups of persons cannot be admitted or fully accepted. The
solution is not merely to accept the hypocritical result of citizenship theory’s egalitarian nature vis-àvis its application, but, indeed, to apply the egalitarian concept in accordance with the principles of
nationhood that this country espouses.
While some may argue, as others have for over 2500 years, that a nation’s greatness depends
on the caliber of its citizens, one should remember that the survival of an idea does not necessarily
make it any more correct or less narrow-minded. Accordingly, T.H. Marshall’s status and rights
based paradigm, which focuses on the state’s obligation to ensure the full effectuation of all political,
civil, and social rights for all citizens, is a framework that should be followed. Marshall’s framework
is the closest means to ensure the nation’s greatness is achieved, not through constructions of
superiority, but through recognition of equality. By ensuring the guarantee of fundamental rights to
all its citizens and the equal application of those rights to every member, can greatness be accurately
measured? Nonetheless, the first step towards achieving that laudable goal is to acknowledge the
wrongs of the past. Specifically, this land has to admit that for too long it managed to use
333
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constructions under the law to exclude disfavored groups of every sort throughout civilization’s
history. The unforgivable act, however, is that this exclusion has all too often been advanced
through a concept fundamentally believed to be egalitarian in nature, which demeans the unwanted
group more than would any other form of alienation.

VIII. Conclusion
The United States government’s prosecution of similarly situated individuals that were
accused of engaging in terrorist activities or engaging in war against the United States varies greatly.
The most obvious difference in John Walker Lindh, Yaser Esam Hamdi, and Jose Padilla is that,
while they are United States citizens, they are of different ethnic backgrounds. While we cannot be
certain of the basis for their disparate treatment, what we do know is: (1) One accused was of Arabdescent, one was Puerto Rican, the other was Caucasian. (2) The government put the Caucasian
through our traditional legal system, where he had his day in court and decided to plead guilty; the
government never produced any evidence against the Arab-descendant, but nevertheless gave him
little option other than to renounce his citizenship and agree to be deported or face the possibility of
indefinite confinement; the Puerto Rican remains to this day confined indefinitely as an enemy
combatant. The disparate treatment of these individuals provides fodder for the critics of the
neutrality of the law. The government’s action also raises questions concerning the raced nature of
the domestic war on terror, and will likely be part of the ongoing civil rights versus national security
debate following September 11.
This project uses the current debate regarding the appropriate levels of civil rights held by
those accused of terrorism to contextualize a broader debate concerning the application of the
citizenship construct and the rights associated with that construct. The bulk of the literature on both
sides of the post-September 11, civil rights-national security debate merely compares the treatment
of Arab-Americans and Muslim-Americans after September 11 to the World War II era Japanese
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internment cases. While such comparisons are appropriate, the disparate treatment of citizens dates
considerably further back than World War II. Differences or gradations of citizenship are the little
known component of the construct of citizenship. While the term is almost universally recognized
as including a notion of equality among all those holding the title, the application, as well as a lesser
known aspect of the construct, also condones inequality among those who should or do hold the
status. While historically these differences between the members of a society often manifested
themselves in terms of differences in gender or economic class, the differences or stratifications in
the domestic arena have more vividly demonstrated themselves when ethnic and racial minority
groups sought full and equal membership. Unfortunately, the United States Supreme Court and
Congress throughout this country’s history have repeatedly refused to grant individuals from such
group’s full membership.

While these denials have to some extent been ameliorated by

constitutional amendments, to this day certain groups, such as the indigenous people of this land
and the territorial island people, still hold a formal de jure inferior citizenship status. Other groups,
such as African-Americans continue to challenge whether the formal grant of citizenship, through
vehicles such as the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, granted them full civil and political
participation.
The preceding pages have thus examined a little-addressed phenomenon concerning the
history of citizenship. What emerges from this examination is the fact that despite the repeated
inclusive declarations dating back to the term’s genesis, not all who have possessed the status, or by
definition of the concept should have held the status, have had anything resembling the full
compliment of rights one would expect from the status.

In the domestic arena, despite a

constitutional amendment that is premised on equality of membership, that bestows citizenship on
all born or naturalized in the United States, and was specifically written to endow African-Americans
with the status of citizenship, a history of United States citizenship reveals that disfavored groups
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rarely easily attained citizenship status.

And when such groups, particularly ethnic and racial

minorities, attained the de jure status, the United States repeatedly denied full membership or
participation in the American body politic. Indeed, each and every major racial minority group
within the United States during this country’s crucial juridical period exploring the bounds and
applicability of citizenship—from roughly 1822-1922—the Supreme Court defined citizenship in
such a manner to exclude the minority group from a notion of full or equal citizenship. This
phenomenon of differentiated levels of participation occurred when, in addition to other disfavored
groups, African-Americans, the indigenous people of this land, and the inhabitants of the territorial
islands challenged their status as citizens.
Largely basing their decisions on racist and xenophobic constructions, the Court and
Congress disenfranchised these groups.

To this day, some within this society, which by the

definition of the concept should be full and equal citizens, continue to exist in a formal or de jure
inferior status. As witnessed by the Civil Rights Commission Report on the 2000 Presidential
Election, others such as African-Americans, despite a civil war, a constitutional amendment, and an
era of civil rights, may actually remain in a less than equal status. A new vision of citizenship is
needed: one where the proclamations of equality are not just laudable declarations that merely
espouse an ideal that is attainable for only certain groups within a society. The question that remains
is: When will constitutional scholars, practitioners, jurists, political leaders, activists, and the
populous insist that the stratifications of citizenship come to an end?
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